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Abstract
We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players
has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical
schemes for the value function of this game, which is given by the solution of a quasilinear partial
differential equation with obstacle.
Keywords. Stochastic Differential Games, Information Incompleteness, Viscosity Solutions, Approxi-
mation
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1 Introduction
In 1967 Aumann and Maschler presented their celebrated model for games with incomplete infor-
mation, see [1] and references therein. The game they consider consists in a set of, say I, standard
discrete time two person zero-sum games. At the beginning one of these zero-sum games is picked
at random according to a probability p. The information which game was picked is transmitted to
Player 1 only, while Player 2 just knows p. It is assumed that both players observe the actions of the
other one, so Player 2 might infer from the actions of his opponent which game is actually played. It
turns out that it is optimal for the informed player to play with an additional randomness. Namely
in a such a way, that he optimally manipulates the beliefs of the uninformed player.
The extension to two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games has recently been given by Cardalia-
guet and Rainer in [10], [8], where the value function is characterized by the unique viscosity solution
of a Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs (HJI) equation with an obstacle in the form of a convexity constraint
in p. The HJI equation without obstacle is the one which is also found to characterize stochastic
differential games in the classical work of Fleming and Souganidis [15]. The probability p appears as
an additional parameter in which the value function has to be convex.
In Cardaliaguet [9] an approximation scheme for the value function of deterministic differential games
with incomplete information is introduced. An extension of [9] to deterministic games with information
incompleteness on both sides is given in the work of Souquiere [22]. We consider the case where the
underlying dynamic is given by a diffusion with controlled drift but uncontrolled non-degenerate
volatility. In constrast to [9] and [22] we can work on the problem under a Girsanov transform.
This transform is a well known tool to consider stochastic games with complete information in the
context of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) (see Hamade`ne and Lepeltier [18]). An
approximation of the value function of a stochastic differential game via BSDEs has been discussed
in Bally [2]. Different to [2] our algorithm is closely related to the work of Barles and Souganidis
[4] who consider monotone approximation schemes for fully nonlinear second order partial differential
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equations. The latter was also applied in the recent work of Fahim, Touzi and Warin [12] where fully
nonlinear parabolic PDEs are treated. As in [12] we use a kind of finite difference scheme for the HIJ
backwards in time and combine it with taking the convex hull in p at each time step to capture the
effect of the information incompleteness. Note that this rather direct ansatz using a probabilistic PDE
scheme also significantly differs from the Makov chain approximation method for stochastic differential
games described in Kushner [21].
From the very beginning of the investigation of BSDEs initiated by Peng in [23] the close relationship
with optimal control problems and quasilinear PDEs has been exploited. Consequently, also the
approximation of solutions to BSDEs and to quasilinear PDEs are closely related. For a survey on
BSDEs we refer to El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [13], while a survey on the numerical approximation
of BSDEs can be found in Bouchard, Elie and Touzi [5]. In this sense our result can also be interpreted
as approximation of the solutions to the BSDEs which appear in the BSDE representation of the value
function for stochastic differential games with incomplete information in [17].
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the game and restate the results of [10]
and [8] which build the basis for our investigation. In section 3 we present the approximation scheme
and give some regularity proofs. Section 4 is devoted to the convergence proof.
2 Setup
2.1 Formal description of the game
Let C([t0, T ];R
d) be the set of continuous functions from R to Rd, which are constant on (−∞, t0]
and on [T,+∞). We denote by Bs(ωB) = ωB(s) the coordinate mapping on C([t0, T ];R
d) and define
H = (Hs) as the filtration generated by s 7→ Bs. We denote Ωt = {ω ∈ C([t, T ];R
d)} and Ht,s the
σ-algebra generated by paths up to time s in Ωt. Furthermore we provide C([t0, T ];R
d) with the
Wiener measure P0 on (Hs).
In the following we investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game starting at a time t ≥ t0 with
terminal time T . For any fixed initial data t ∈ [t0, T ], x ∈ R
d the two players control a diffusion on
(C([t, T ];Rd), (Ht,s)s∈[t,T ],H,P
0) given by
dXt,x,u,vs = b(s,X
t,x,u,v
s , us, vs)ds+ σ(s,X
t,x,u,v
s )dBs X
t,x
t = x. (1)
where we assume that the controls of the players u, v can only take their values in some compact
subsets of some finite dimensional spaces, denoted by U , V respectively.
The aim of the game is to optimize
(i) running costs: (li)i∈{1,...,I} : [t0, T ]× R
d × U × V → R
(ii) terminal payoffs: (gi)i∈{1,...,I} : R
d → R,
which are chosen according to a probability p ∈ ∆(I) before the game starts. At the beginning of the
game this information is transmitted only to Player 1. We assume that Player 1 chooses his control
to minimize, Player 2 chooses his control to maximize the expected payoff. Furthermore we assume
both players observe their opponents control. So Player 2, knowing only the probability pi for scenario
i ∈ {1, . . . , I} at the beginning, will try to guess the missing information from the behavior of his
opponent.
The following will be the standing assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption (A)
(i) b : [t0, T ] × R
d × U × V → Rd is bounded and continuous in all its variables and Lipschitz
continuous with respect to (t, x) uniformly in (u, v).
(ii) For 1 ≤ k, l ≤ d the function σk,l : [t0, T ]× R
d → R is bounded and Lipschitz continuous with
respect to (t, x). For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd the matrix σ∗(t, x) is non-singular and (σ∗)−1(t, x)
is bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x).
(iii) (li)i∈I : [t0, T ]× R
d × U × V → R is bounded and continuous in all its variables and Lipschitz
continuous with respect to (t, x) uniformly in (u, v). (gi)i∈I : R
d → R is bounded and uniformly
Lipschitz continuous.
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(iv) Isaacs condition: for all (t, x, ξ, p) ∈ [t0, T ]× R
d × Rd ×∆(I)
infu∈U supv∈V
{
〈b(t, x, u, v), ξ〉+
∑I
i=1 pili(t, x, u, v)
}
= supv∈V infu∈U
{
〈b(t, x, u, v), ξ〉+
∑I
i=1 pili(t, x, u, v)
}
=: H(t, x, ξ, p).
(2)
By assumption (A) the HamiltonianH is Lipschitz continuous in (ξ, p) uniformly in (t, x) and Lipschitz
continuous in (t, x) with Lipschitz constant c(1 + |ξ|), i.e. it holds for all t, t′ ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rd,
ξ, ξ′ ∈ Rd, p, p′ ∈ ∆(I)
|H(t, x, ξ, p)| ≤ c(1 + |ξ|) (3)
and
|H(t, x, ξ, p)−H(t′, x′, ξ′, p′)| ≤ c(1 + |ξ|)(|x − x′|+ |t− t′|) + c|ξ − ξ′|+ c|p− p′|. (4)
2.2 Strategies and value function
We now give the necessary definitions and the results of [8] and [10] on which we will base our
investigation.
Definition 2.1. For any t ∈ [t0, T [ an admissible control u = (us)s∈[t,T ] for Player 1 is a progressively
measurable process with respect to the filtration (Ht,s)s∈[t,T ] with values in U . The set of admissible
controls for Player 1 is denoted by U(t).
The definition for admissible controls v = (vs)s∈[t,T ] for Player 2 is similar. The set of admissible
controls for Player 2 is denoted by V(t).
Definition 2.2. A strategy for Player 1 at time t ∈ [t0, T [ is a map α : [t, T ] × C([t, T ];R
d) ×
L0([t, T ];V ) → U which is nonanticipative with delay, i.e. there is δ > 0 such that for all s ∈ [t, T ]
for any f, f ′ ∈ C([t, T ];Rd) and g, g′ ∈ L0([t, T ];V ) it holds: f = f ′ and g = g′ a.e. on [t, s] ⇒
α(·, f, g) = α(·, f ′, g′) a.e. on [t, s+ δ]. The set of strategies for Player 1 is denoted by A(t).
The definition of strategies β : [t, T ]×C([t, T ];Rd)×L0([t, T ];U)→ V for Player 2 is similar. The set
of strategies for Player 2 is denoted by B(t).
With Definition 2.2. it is possible to prove via a fixed point argument the following Lemma, which is
a slight modification of Lemma 5.1. in [10].
Lemma 2.3. To each pair of strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t) one can associate a unique couple of
admissible controls (u, v) ∈ U(t)× V(t), such that for all ω ∈ C([t, T ];Rd)
α(s, ω, v(ω)) = us(ω) and β(s, ω, u(ω)) = vs(ω) .
A characteristic feature of games with incomplete or asymmetric information is that the players have
to find a balance between acting optimally according to their information and hiding it. To this end
it turns out that he will give his behavior a certain additional randomness. This effect is captured in
the following definition.
Definition 2.4. A random strategy for Player 1 at time t ∈ [t0, T [ is a a pair ((Ωα,Gα,Pα), α), where
(Ωα,Gα,Pα) is a probability space in I and α : [t, T ]×Ωα × C([t, T ];R
d)× L0([t, T ];V )→ U satisfies
(i) α is a measurable function, where Ωα is equipped with the σ-field Gα,
(ii) there exists δ > 0 such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and for any f, f ′ ∈ C([t, T ];Rd) and g, g′ ∈
L0([t, T ];V )) it holds:
f = f ′ and g = g′ a.e. on [t, s] ⇒ α(·, f, g) = α(·, f ′, g′) a.e. on [t, s+ δ] for any ω ∈ Ωα.
The set of random strategies for Player 1 is denoted by Ar(t).
The definition of random strategies ((Ωβ ,Gβ ,Pβ), β), where β : [t, T ]×Ωβ×C([t, T ];R
d)×L0([t, T ];U)→
V for Player 2 is similar. The set of random strategies for Player 2 is denoted by Br(t).
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Remark 2.5. Again one can associate to each couple of random strategies (α, β) ∈ Ar(t) × Br(t) for
any (ωα, ωβ) ∈ Ωα × Ωβ a unique couple of admissible strategies (u
ωα,ωβ , vωα,ωβ) ∈ U(t) × V(t), such
that for all ω ∈ C([t, T ];Rd), s ∈ [t, T ]
α(s, ωα, ω, v
ωα,ωβ (ω)) = u
ωα,ωβ
s (ω) and β(s, ωβ , ω, u
ωα,ωβ(ω)) = v
ωα,ωβ
s (ω) .
Furthermore (ωα, ωβ)→ (u
ωα,ωβ , vωα,ωβ ) is a measurable map, from Ωα×Ωβ equipped with the σ-field
Gα ⊗ Gβ to V(t)× U(t) equipped with the Borel σ-field associated to the L
1-distance.
For any (t, x, p) ∈ [t0, T [×R
d ×∆(I), α¯ ∈ (Ar(t))I , β ∈ Br(t) we set
J(t, x, p, α¯, β) =
I∑
i=1
pi Eα¯i,β
[∫ T
0
li(s,X
t,x,α¯i,β
s , (α¯i)s, βs)ds+ gi(X
t,x,α¯i,β
T )
]
, (5)
where as in Remark 2.5. we associate to α¯i, β for any (ωα¯i , ωβ) ∈ Ωα¯i × Ωβ the couple of controls
(uωα¯i ,ωβ , vωα¯i ,ωβ ). The process Xt,x,α¯i,β is then defined for any (ωα¯i , ωβ) as solution to the SDE (1)
with the associated controls. Furthermore Eα¯i,β is the expectation on Ωα¯i × Ωβ × C([t, T ];R
d) with
respect to the probability Pα¯i ⊗ Pβ ⊗ P
0, where P0 denotes the Wiener measure on C([t, T ];Rd).
Under assumption (A) the existence of the value of the game and its characterization as a viscosity
solution to an obstacle problem is shown in [8],[10].
Theorem 2.6. For any (t, x, p) ∈ [t0, T [×R
d×∆(I) the value of the game with incomplete information
V (t, x, p) is given by
V (t, x, p) = inf α¯∈(Ar(t))I supβ∈Br(t) J(t, x, p, α¯, β)
= supβ∈Br(t) inf α¯∈(Ar(t))I J(t, x, p, α¯, β).
(6)
Furthermore the function V : [0, T [×Rd ×∆(I)→ R is the unique viscosity solution to
min
{
∂w
∂t
+
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x)D2xw) +H(t, x,Dxw, p), λmin
(
p,
∂2w
∂p2
)}
= 0 (7)
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) =
∑
i pigi(x), where for all p ∈ ∆(I), A ∈ S
I
λmin(p,A) := min
z∈T∆(I)(p)\{0}
〈Az, z〉
|z|2
. (8)
and T∆(I)(p) denotes the tangent cone to ∆(I) at p, i.e. T∆(I)(p) = ∪λ>0(∆(I) − p)/λ .
Remark 2.7. Unlike the standard definition of viscosity solutions (see e.g. [11]) the subsolution prop-
erty to (7) is required only on the interior of ∆(I) while the supersolution property to (7) is required
on the whole domain ∆(I) (see [8] and [10]). This is due to the fact that we actually consider viscosity
solutions with a state constraint, namely p ∈ ∆(I) ( RI . For more details we refer to [7].
3 Approximation of the value function
3.1 Numerical scheme
Our approximation scheme of the value function basically amounts to approximate the solution of the
obstacle problem (7). In order to do so it is convenient to consider the real dynamics of the game (1)
under a Girsanov transform. This technique - first applied to stochastic differential games by [18] -
enables us to decouple the forward dynamics (1) from the controls of the players. As in [2] where this
transformation is applied in the context of numerical approximation for stochastic differential games
via BSDE we will use the following approximation for the forward dynamics .
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For L ∈ N we define a partition of [t0, T ] with stepsize τ =
T
L
by Πτ = {t0, t1, . . . , tL = T }. Then for
all k = 0, . . . , L, x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I) let (Xtk,xs )s∈[tk,T ] denote the diffusion
Xtk,xs = x+
∫ s
tk
σ(r,Xt,xr )dBr. (9)
Furthermore we define the discrete process (X¯k,xn )n=k,...,L as the standard Euler scheme approximation
for (9) on Πτ
X¯k,xn = x+
n−1∑
j=k
σ(tj , X¯
k,x
j )∆B
j , (10)
where ∆Bj = Btj+1 −Btj .
We will approximate the value function (6) backwards in time. To do so we set for all x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I)
V τ (tL, x, p) = 〈p, g(x)〉 (11)
and we define recursively for k = L− 1, . . . , 0
V τ (tk−1, x, p) = Vexp
(
E
[
V τ (tk, X¯
k−1,x
k , p)
]
+ τH(tk−1, x, z¯k−1(x, p), p)
)
, (12)
where z¯k−1(x, p) is given by
z¯k−1(x, p) =
1
τ
E
[
V τ (tk, X¯
k−1,x
k , p)(σ
∗)−1(tk−1, x)∆B
k−1
]
(13)
and Vexp denotes the convex hull, i.e. the largest function that is convex in the variable p and does
not exceed the given function.
3.2 Some regularity properties
3.2.1 Monotonicity
First we show that our scheme fulfills a monotonicity condition which corresponds to the one in [4]
(2.2). It is well known that this criteria is crucial for the convergence of general finite difference
schemes.
Lemma 3.1. Let φ : Rd → R be a uniformly Lipschitz continuous function with Lipschitz constant
M . Then there exists for all x, x′ ∈ Rd a θ ∈ Rd with |θ| ≤M
φ(x) − φ(x′) = 〈θ, x− x′〉
Proof: For φ ∈ C1 the result follows from partial integration with θ =
∫ 1
0
Dxφ(x + r(x
′ − x))dr.
For the case of general Lipschitz continuous function φ one chooses a sequence of C1 functions (φǫ)ǫ>0
which converges uniformly to φ. Since φ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, we may assume that the
absolute value of Dxφ
ǫ and hence the corresponding θǫ are uniformly bounded by the constant M .
Consequently, possibly passing though a subsequence, there exists a θ ∈ Rd with |θ| ≤ M such that
the lemma holds.
With the help of Lemma 3.1 we now establish:
Lemma 3.2. Let k ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1} and φ, ψ : Rd → R be two Lipschitz continuous functions. Then
for any x ∈ R, p ∈ ∆(I)
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)
]
+ τH(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
≥ E
[
ψ(X¯k,xk+1)
]
+ τH(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
ψ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)− τO(τ),
where O(τ) is independent of p.
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Proof: By (4) H is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in ξ. So by Lemma 3.1. there exists a θ ∈ Rd
with |θ| ≤M , where M denotes the Lipschitz constant of H , such that
E
[
(φ − ψ)(X¯k,xk+1)
]
+ τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
−H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
ψ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p))
)
= E
[
(φ− ψ)(X¯k,xk+1)
]
+
〈
τθ,
(
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
−
1
τ
E
[
ψ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
])〉
= E
[
(φ− ψ)(X¯k,xk+1)
]
+
〈
θ,E
[
(φ− ψ)(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]〉
= E
[
(φ− ψ)(X¯k,xk+1)
(
1 + 〈θ, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉
)]
.
Since 0 ≤ φ(x) − ψ(x) ≤ c for any x ∈ R, we have
E
[
(φ− ψ)(X¯k,xk+1)
(
1 + 〈θ, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉
)]
≥ E
[
(φ− ψ)(X¯k,xtk+1)1|∆Bk|≥‖θσ−1‖−1∞ 〈θ, (σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉
]
≥ −CE
[
1|∆Bk|≥ 1
C
|∆Bk|
]
with C := ‖Mσ−1‖∞ independent of (tk, x, p) and τ . Furthermore we can explicitely calculate
E
[
1|∆Bk|≥ 1
C
|∆Bk|
]
=
1
(2π)
d
2 (τ)
1
2
∫ ∞
|x|≥ 1
C
|x|e−
x2
2τ dx =
1
2
d
2−1Γ(d2 )
τ
1
2 e−
1
2C2τ ,
where Γ denotes the gamma function.
3.2.2 Lipschitz continuity in x
To show that the Lipschitz continuity in x is preserved under the scheme, we establish the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Let k ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} and φ : Rd → R be a uniformly Lipschitz continuous function
with Lipschitz constant M . Then for any k ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, x, x′ ∈ R, p ∈ ∆(I)∣∣∣∣E [φ(X¯k,xk+1)]+ τH(tk, x, 1τ E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
−E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)
]
− τH(tk, x
′,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]
, p)
∣∣∣∣
≤ CM,τ |x− x′|,
where CM,τ = M(1 + cτ) + cτ with c independent of p.
Proof: We fix k ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, x, x′ ∈ R, p ∈ ∆(I) and write
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)− φ(X¯
k,x′
k+1)
]
+ τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
−H(tk, x
′, 1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]
, p)
)
= E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)− φ(X¯
k,x′
k+1)
]
+τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
−H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]
, p)
)
+τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]
, p)
−H(tk, x
′, 1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]
, p)
)
.
(14)
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Assume that φ ∈ C1 with |Dxφ| ≤ M . First we consider the last term of (14). We have for Θ
1 :=∫ 1
0 Dxφ(x
′ + rσ(tk, x
′)∆Bk)dr that |Θ1| ≤M and∣∣∣∣1τ E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]∣∣∣∣ = 1τ
∣∣E [φ(x′)(σ∗)−1(tk, x′)∆Bk +Θ1|∆Bk|2]∣∣
≤ M.
Since by (4) the HamiltonianH is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x with Lipschitz constant c(1+|ξ|)
it holds
τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]
, p)−H(tk, x
′,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]
, p)
)
≤ τc(1 +M)|x− x′|.
For the remaining terms in (14) we note that by (4) the Hamiltonian H is uniformly Lipschitz con-
tinuous. So there exists as in Lemma 3.1. a θ1 ∈ Rd with |θ1| ≤ c, such that
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)− φ(X¯
k,x′
k+1)
]
+τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)−H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
]
, p)
)
= E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)− φ(X¯
k,x′
k+1)
]
+〈θ1,
(
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
− E
[
φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′)∆Bk
])
〉
= E
[
(φ(X¯k,xk+1)− φ(X¯
k,x′
k+1))(1 + 〈θ
1, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉)
]
(15)
+E
[
〈θ1, φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)((σ
∗)−1(tk, x)− (σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′))∆Bk〉
]
.
For the first term of (15) we have with Θ2 :=
∫ 1
0
Dxφ(X¯
k,x
k+1 + r(X¯
k,x′
k+1 − X¯
k,x
k+1))dr
E
[
(φ(X¯k,xk+1)− φ(X¯
k,x′
k+1))(1 + 〈θ
1, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉)
]
= E
[〈
Θ2, X¯k,xk+1 − X¯
k,x′
k+1
〉
(1 + 〈θ1, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉)
]
≤ E
[〈
Θ2, (1 + 〈θ1, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉)(x − x′) + (σ(tk, x)− σ(tk, x
′))∆Bk
〉]
+cτ |x − x′|.
We finally use Cauchy-Schwartz (note that in the expansion of the square the ∆Bk parts vanish when
taking expectation), |Θ2| ≤M and the Lipschitz contiunity of σ to get
E
[〈
Θ2, (1 + 〈θ1, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉)(x − x′) + (σ(tk, x)− σ(tk, x
′))∆Bk
〉]
≤ME
[(
(1 + 〈θ1, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉)(x − x′) + (σ(tk, x)− σ(tk, x
′))∆Bk
)2] 12
≤M |x− x′|
(
E
[
1 + c|∆Bk|2
]) 1
2 = M |x− x′|(1 + cτ)
1
2 ≤M |x− x′|(1 +
c
2
τ).
For the second term of (15) we use the uniform Lipschitz continuity of (σ∗)−1 (by assumption (A)) to
have with the Rd-valued random variable Θ3 :=
∫ 1
0 Dxφ(X¯
k,x′
k+1 + r(X¯
k,x′
k+1 − x
′))dr
E
[
〈θ1, φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)((σ
∗)−1(tk, x)− (σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′))∆Bk〉
]
= E
[
〈θ1, φ(X¯k,x
′
k+1)((σ
∗)−1(tk, x)− (σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′))∆Bk〉
]
= E
[
〈θ1, (φ(x′) + 〈Θ3, σ(t, x′)∆Bk〉)((σ∗)−1(tk, x)− (σ
∗)−1(tk, x
′))∆Bk〉
]
≤ cMτ |x− x′|.
The case of Lipschitz continuous φ follows by approximation with a sequence of C1 functions (φǫ)ǫ>0
which converges uniformly to φ. Since φ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous with constant M , we may
assume that |Dxφ
ǫ| ≤M for all ǫ > 0.
With the previous Lemma it is easy to show the Lipschitz continuity of V τ (t·, x, p) in x.
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Proposition 3.4. V τ (t·, x, p) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x with a Lipschitz constant that
depends only on the constants of assumption (A).
Proof: We will show Proposition 3.5. by induction. With (A) we have that V τ (tL, x, p) is Lipschitz
continuous in x with a constant ML that depends only on the constants of assumption (A). Let Mk
be the Lipschitz constant for V τ (tk, ·, p) then by (12) and Lemma 3.3. and since Vex is monotonic,
we have
|V τ (tk−1, x, p)− V
τ (tk−1, x
′, p)| ≤Mk((1 + cτ)
1
2 + cτ) + cτ)|x − x′|.
Hence Mk−1 := Mk(1 + cτ) + cτ is a Lipschitz constant for V
τ (tk−1, ·, p) and M := MLCe
CT
for a C independent of τ, x, p is a constant dominating the recursively defined Lipschitz constants
(Mk)k=0,...,L.
With the uniform Lipschitz continuity of V τ in x it follows that the value function is uniformly
bounded.
Proposition 3.5. V τ (t·, x, p) is uniformly bounded by a constant only depending on the constants of
assumption (A).
Proof: Fix k ∈ {0, L− 1}, x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I). Assume first that V τ is at tk+1 continuously differen-
tiable in the second variable with |DxV
τ | ≤M . Then with Θ :=
∫ 1
0 DxV
τ (tk+1, x+rσ(tk , x)∆B
k, p)dr
|z¯k(x, p)| =
1
τ
∣∣E [V τ (tk+1, x+ σ(tk, x)∆Bk, p)(σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆Bk]∣∣
= 1
τ
∣∣E [V τ (tk+1, x, p)(σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆Bk +Θ|∆Bk|2]∣∣
≤ M.
(16)
Since V τ is by Lemma 3.3. uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x one has (16) in the general case again
by regularization.
By (A) V τ (tL, x, p) is bounded by a constant ML that depends only on the constants of assumption
(A). Let Mk be a bound for |V
τ (tk, ·, p)| then by (3) the definition (12) and (16) we have
E
[
V τ (tk, X¯
k−1,x
k , p)
]
+ τH(tk−1, x, z¯k−1(x, p), p) ≤Mk + cτ(1 +M)
and ML + cT (1 +M) is a constant dominating the recursively defined constants (Mk)k=0,...,L.
3.2.3 Lipschitz continuity in p
The Lipschitz continuity of V τ (t·, x, p) in p can be shown with similar methods.
Lemma 3.6. Let k ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} and φ : Rd × ∆(I) → R be a uniformly Lipschitz continuous
function with Lipschitz constant M . Then for any k ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, x ∈ Rd, p, p′ ∈ ∆(I)∣∣∣∣E [φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)]+ τH(tk, x, 1τ E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
−E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p
′)
]
− τH(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p
′)(σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p′)
∣∣∣∣
≤ C¯M,τ |p− p′|,
where C¯M,τ = M(1 + cτ) + cτ .
Proof: We fix k ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, x ∈ Rd, p, p′ ∈ ∆(I). First note that by (4) the Hamiltonian is
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uniformly Lipschitz in p. Hence
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)− φ(X¯
k,x
k+1, p
′)
]
+ τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
−H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p
′)(σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p′)
)
≤ E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)− φ(X¯
k,x
k+1, p
′)
]
+ τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
−H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p
′)(σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
)
+ cτ |p− p′|.
By (4) the Hamiltonian H is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in ξ with a constant c. So by Lemma
3.1.
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)− φ(X¯
k,x
k+1, p
′)
]
+ τ
(
H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
−H(tk, x,
1
τ
E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p
′)(σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, p)
)
= E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)− φ(X¯
k,x
k+1, p
′)
]
+
〈
θ,E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
− E
[
φ(X¯k,xk+1, p
′)(σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]〉
= E
[
(φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)− φ(X¯
k,x
k+1, p
′))(1 + 〈θ, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k)〉
]
.
Assume for now that φ is differentiable in p with |Dpφ| ≤M . Then with Θ :=
∫ 1
0 Dpφ(X¯
k,x
k+1, p+r(p−
p′))dr we have
E
[
(φ(X¯k,xk+1, p)− φ(X¯
k,x
k+1, p
′))(1 + 〈θ, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k)〉
]
= E
[
〈Θ, (1 + 〈θ, (σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k〉)(p− p′)〉
]
≤M |p− p′|
(
E
[
1 + c|∆Bk|2
]) 1
2 = M |p− p′|(1 + cτ)
1
2 ≤M |p− p′|(1 +
c
2
τ),
where for the first estimate in the last line we used again Cauchy Schwartz as in the previous Lemma.
The general case follows again by regularization.
It is now easy to show the Lipschitz continuity of V τ (t·, x, p) in p as in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.7. V τ (t·, x, p) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p with a Lipschitz constant only
depending on the constants of assumption (A).
3.2.4 Ho¨lder continuity in t
Finally we use the Lipschitz continuity of V τ in x to establish the Ho¨lder continuity in time.
Proposition 3.8. For all L ∈ N, x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I) it holds that (t., x, p) → V
τ (t., x, p) is Ho¨lder
continuous in t., in the sense that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1}, l ∈ {1, . . . L− k}, there exists a constant
c only depending on the constants of assumption (A), such that
|V τ (tk+l, x, p)− V
τ (tk, x, p)| ≤ c|tk+l − tk|
1
2 .
Proof: We fix (x, p) ∈ Rd ×∆(I). By (12), (3) and the convexity of V τ in p we have
|V τ (tk+l, x, p)− V
τ (tk, x, p)|
=
∣∣∣V τ (tk+l, x, p)−Vexp (E [V τ (tk+1, X¯k,xk+1, p)]+ τH(tk, x, z¯k(x, p), p))∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣E [V τ (tk+l, x, p)− V τ (tk+1, X¯k,xk+1, p)]∣∣∣+ cτ(1 +M),
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where we used that by (16) |z¯k(x, p)| is bounded uniformly in p ∈ ∆(I) by the Lipschitz constant of
V τ in x. Note that by definition (12)
V τ (tk+1, X¯
k,x
k+1, p) = Vexp
(
E
[
V τ (tk+2, X¯
k+1,x′
k+2 , p)
]
+ τH(r, x′, z¯k+1(x
′, p), p)
)∣∣∣∣
x′=X¯k,x
k+1
.
Hence by (A) and the fact that V τ is convex in p we have∣∣∣V τ (tk+l, x, p)− E [V τ (tk+1, X¯k,xk+1, p)]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣V τ (tk+l, x, p)
−E
[
Vexp
(
E
[
V τ (tk+2, X¯
k+1,x′
k+2 , p)
]
+ τH(r, x′, z¯k+1(x
′, p), p)
)∣∣∣∣
x′=X¯k,x
k+1
]∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣V τ (tk+l, x, p)− E
[
V τ (tk+2, X¯
k+1,X¯k,x
k+1
k+2 , p)
]∣∣∣∣+ cτ(1 +M)
=
∣∣∣V τ (tk+l, x, p)− E [V τ (tk+2, X¯k,xk+2, p)]∣∣∣+ cτ(1 +M).
Since lτ = |tk+l − tk| repeating this now l− 2 times gives
|V τ (tk+l, x, p)− V
τ (tk, x, p)| ≤
∣∣∣V τ (tk+l, x, p)− E [V τ (tk+l, X¯k,xk+l, p)]∣∣∣+ c(1 +M)|tk+l − tk|.
Furthermore by the Lipschitz continutity of V τ in x and (A) it holds∣∣∣V τ (tk+l, x, p)− E [V τ (tk+l, X¯k,xk+l, p)]∣∣∣ ≤ME [|X¯k,xk+l − x|] ≤ c|tk+l − tk| 12 ,
hence
|V τ (tk+l, x, p)− V
τ (tk, x, p)| ≤M |tk+l − tk|
1
2 + c(1 +M)|tk+l − tk|.
4 Convergence
Theorem 4.1. Under (A) we have uniform convergence on the compact subsets of [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I),
i.e.
lim
τ↓0,tk→t,x′→x,p′→p
V τ (tk, x
′, p′) = V (t, x, p). (17)
Note that by Proposition 3.5. the family (V τ , τ > 0) is uniformly bounded. Furthermore by Proposi-
tion 3.4., 3.7. and 3.8. the family (V τ , τ > 0) is equicontinuous, hence by Arzela Ascoli compact for
the topology of uniform convergence. Furthermore any candidate for the limit of V τ as τ ↓ 0 is as a
limit of convex functions convex in p.
Let w : [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I)→ R be a candidate for the limit. We will show that w is a viscosity solu-
tion to (7). Since this property uniquely characterizes the value function V the convergence follows
immediately.
4.1 One step a posteriori martingales and DPP
By construction there exists at each time step tk for any x ∈ R
d and p ∈ ∆(I) a linear combination
of πk,1(x, p), . . . , πk,I(x, p) ∈ ∆(I) such that
I∑
l=1
λkl (x, p)π
k,l(x, p) = p
I∑
l=1
λkl (x, p) = 1 (18)
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and
V τ (tk, x, p)
=
∑I
l=1 λ
k
l (x, p)
(
E
[
V τ (tk+1, X¯
k,x
k+1, π
k,l(x, p))
]
+ τH(tk, x, z¯k(x, π
k,l(x, p)), πk,l(x, p))
)
(19)
with
z¯k(x, π
k,l(x, p)) =
1
τ
E
[
V τ (tk+1, X¯
k,x
k+1, π
k,l(x, p))(σ∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
]
, (20)
where we can choose (x, p)→ λk(x, p) ∈ ∆(I) and (x, p)→ πk(x, p) ∈ ∆(I)I Borel measurable.
Definition 4.2. For all i ∈ I, k = 0, . . . , L, x ∈ Rn and p ∈ ∆(I) we define the one step feedbacks
pi,x,pk+1 as ∆(I)-valued random variables which are independent of σ(Bs)s∈R, such that
(i) for k = 0, . . . , L− 1
(a) if pi = 0 set p
i,x,p
k+1 = p
(b) if pi > 0: p
i,x,p
k+1 ∈ {π
k,1(x, p), . . . , πk,I(x, p)} with probability
P
[
pi,x,pk+1 = π
k,l(x, p)|(pj,x
′,p′
l )j∈{1,...,I},x′∈R,p′∈∆I,l∈{1,...,k}
]
= λkl (x, p)
(πk,l(x, p))i
pi
(ii) for k = L set pi,x,pL+1 = e
i.
Furthermore we define one step a posteriori martingales px,pk+1 = p
i,x,p
k+1 , where the index i is a ran-
dom variable with law p, independent of σ(Bs)s∈[0,T ] and (p
j,x′,p′
l )j∈{1,...,I},x′∈R,p′∈∆I,l∈{1,...,L}. The
martingale property is a direct consequence of the proof of the Lemma given below.
The following one step dynamic programming is a direct consequence of Definition 4.2.
Lemma 4.3. For all k = 0, . . . , L− 1, x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I) we have
V τ (tk, x, p) = E
[
V τ (tk+1, X¯
k,x
k+1,p
x,p
k+1) + τH(tk, x, z¯k(x,p
x,p
k+1),p
x,p
k+1)
]
(21)
with
z¯k(x,p
x,p
k+1) =
1
τ
E
[
V τ (tk+1, X¯
k,x
k+1, p)(σ
∗)−1(tk, x)∆B
k
] ∣∣∣∣
p=px,p
k+1
. (22)
Proof: Assume (p)i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I. By the construction for all suitable functions f : ∆(I)→
R it holds
E[f(px,pk+1)] =
I∑
i=1
E
[
1{i=i}f(p
i,x,p
k+1 )
]
=
I∑
i=1
E
[
1{i=i}
]
E
[
f(pi,x,pk+1 )
]
=
I∑
i=1
pi
I∑
l=1
λkl (x, p)
(πk,l(x, p))i
pi
f((πk,l(x, p)))
=
I∑
l=1
λkl (x, p)f(π
k,l(x, p))
and the Lemma follows with (19).
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4.2 Viscosity solution property
4.2.1 Viscosity subsolution property of w
Proposition 4.4. w is a viscosity subsolution of (7) on [0, T ]× Rd × Int(∆(I)).
Proof: Let φ : [0, T ]×R×∆(I)→ R be a test function such that w−φ has a strict global maximum
at (t¯, x¯, p¯), where p¯ ∈ Int(∆(I)). We have to show, that
min
{
∂φ
∂t
+
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x)D2xφ) +H(t, x,Dxφ, p), λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)}
≥ 0 (23)
holds at (t¯, x¯, p¯). As a limit of convex functions w is convex in p and we have since p¯ ∈ Int(∆(I))
λmin
(
p¯,
∂2φ
∂p2
(t¯, x¯, p¯)
)
≥ 0.
So it remains to show
∂φ
∂t
+
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x)D2xφ) +H(t, x,Dxφ, p) ≥ 0. (24)
Note that by standard arguments (e.g. [3]) there exists a sequence (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)k∈N such that t¯k =
lk
T
k
= lkτ ∈ Π
τ converges to t¯ and (x¯k, p¯k) converge to (x¯, p¯) and such that V
τ − φ has a global
maximum at (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k).
Define φτ = φ+ (V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)− φ(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)) = φ+∆τ . Hence for all x ∈ R, p ∈ ∆(I)
V τ (t¯k + τ, x, p)− φ
τ (t¯k + τ, x, p) ≤ V
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)− φ
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) = 0.
Set
X¯k+1 = x¯k + σ(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk
and
z¯k =
1
τ
E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)(σ
∗)−1(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk
]
.
By the definition of V τ (12) it holds
0 = Vexp
(
E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k) + τH(t¯k, x¯k, z¯k, p¯k)ds
])
− V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)
≤ E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)
]
+ τH(t¯k, x¯k, z¯k, p¯k)− V
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k).
Hence by the monotonicity Lemma 3.2. we have for all τ > 0
0 ≤ E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k) + τH(t¯k, x¯k,
1
τ
E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)(σ
∗)−1(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk
]
, p¯k)
]
−V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)
≤ E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k) + τH(t¯k, x¯k,
1
τ
E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)(σ
∗)−1(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk
]
, p¯k)
]
−φτ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) + τO(τ).
By expansion of the smooth function φτ we have since φτ is equal to φ with the linear shift ∆τ the
inequality (24).
4.2.2 Viscosity supersolution property of w
Proposition 4.5. w is a viscosity supersolution of (7) on [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I).
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Proof: To show that w(t, x, p) is a viscosity supersolution of (7) let φ : [0, T ]× R ×∆(I) be a test
function, such that w − φ has a strict global minimum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) with w(t¯, x¯, p¯) − φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0 and
such that its derivatives are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p.
We have to show, that
min
{
∂φ
∂t
+
1
2
tr(σσT (t, x)D2xφ) + b(t, x)Dxφ+H(t, x,Dxφ, p), λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)}
≤ 0 (25)
holds at (t¯, x¯, p¯). Observe that, if λmin
(
∂2φ
∂p2
)
≤ 0 at (t¯, x¯, p¯), then (25) follows immediately. So we
assume now λmin
(
∂2φ
∂p2
)
> 0.
By standard arguments (e.g. [3]) there exists a sequence (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)k∈N such that t¯k = lkτ ∈ Π
τ
converges to t¯ and (x¯k, p¯k) converge to (x¯, p¯) and such that V
τ−φ has a global minimum at (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k).
Define φτ = φ+ (V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)− φ(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)) = φ+∆τ . Since the minimum is global, we have
V τ (t¯k + τ, x, p)− φ
τ (t¯k + τ, x, p) ≥ V
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)− φ(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) = 0.
Note that by the assumption λmin
(
∂2φ
∂p2
)
> 0 there exists δ, η > 0 such that for all k great enough we
have
〈
∂2φτ
∂p2
(t, x, p)z, z〉 > 4δ|z|2 ∀(x, p) ∈ Bη(x¯k, p¯k), t ∈ [t¯k, t¯k + τ ], z ∈ T∆(I)(p¯k). (26)
Since φτ is a test function for a purely local viscosity notion, one can modify it outside a neighborhood
of (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k), such that for all (s, x) ∈ [t¯k, T ]×R
d the function φτ (s, x, ·) is convex on the whole convex
domain ∆(I). Thus for any p ∈ ∆(I) it holds
V τ (s, x, p) ≥ φτ (s, x, p) ≥ φτ (s, x, p¯k) + 〈
∂φτ
∂p
(s, x, p), p− p¯k〉. (27)
We proceed in several steps.
(1) First we show a local estimate which is stronger than (27) using (26).
(2) In the second step we establish estimates for pk+1 := p
p¯k,x¯k
lk+1
where pp¯k,x¯klk+1 is defined as one step
martingale with initial data (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) as in Definition 4.2.
(3) Then we use the estimates of the second step together with the monotonicity in Lemma 3.3. to
conclude the viscosity supersolution property.
Step 1: We claim that there exist η, δ > 0, such that for all τ > 0 small enough (meaning k great
enough) it holds
V τ (t¯k + τ, x, p) ≥ φ
τ (t¯k + τ, x, p¯k) + 〈
∂φτ
∂p
(t¯k + τ, x, p¯k), p− p¯k〉+ δ|p− p¯k|
2. (28)
for all x ∈ Bη(x¯k), p ∈ ∆(I). By Taylor expansion in p
φτ (t, x, p) ≥ φτ (t, x, p¯k) + 〈
∂φτ
∂p
(t, x, p), p− p¯k〉+ 2δ|p− p¯k|
2 (29)
holds for (x, p) ∈ Bη(x¯k, p¯k), t ∈ [t¯k, t¯k + τ ]. Hence (28) is true locally in p. To establish (28) for all
p ∈ ∆(I) we set for p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(Bη(p¯k))
p˜ = p¯k +
p− p¯k
|p− p¯k|
η.
So by the convexity of V τ in p and (29) we have for a pˆ ∈ ∂V τ−(t¯k, x¯k, p˜)
V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p) ≥ V
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p˜) + 〈pˆ, p− p˜〉
≥ φτ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) + 〈
∂φτ
∂p
(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k), p˜− p¯k〉+ 2δη
2 + 〈pˆ, p− p˜〉
≥ φτ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) + 〈
∂φτ
∂p
(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k), p− p¯k〉+ 2δη
2 + 〈pˆ−
∂φτ
∂p
(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k), p− p˜〉.
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Since ∂φ
τ
∂p
(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) ∈ ∂V
τ−(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) and p− p˜ = c(p− p¯k) (c > 0) and V
τ is convex in p it holds
〈pˆ−
∂φτ
∂p
(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k), p− p˜〉 ≥ 0.
So we have for all p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(Bη(p¯k))
V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p) ≥ φ
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) + 〈
∂φτ
∂p
(t¯k, x¯k, p¯k), p− p¯k〉+ 2δη
2 (30)
which gives in the limit for all p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(Bη(p¯))
w(t¯, x¯, p) ≥ φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) + 〈
∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p− p¯〉+ 2δη2. (31)
Assume now that (28) does not hold for a p ∈ ∆(I). Hence there exists a sequence (τ, xkn , pkn) →
(0, 0, p) with τ = T
n
, pkn ∈ ∆(I) \Bη(p¯kn), such that
V τ (t¯kn + τ, x¯kn + xkn , pkn)
< φτ (t¯kn + τ, x¯kn + xkn , p¯kn) + 〈
∂φτ
∂p
(t¯kn + τ, x¯kn + xkn , pkn), pkn − p¯kn〉+ δ|pkn − p¯kn |
2
Thus for n→∞, p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(Bη(p¯)) and
w(t¯, x¯, p) < φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) + 〈
∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p− p¯〉+ δη2 (32)
which contradicts (31).
In the following we denote
X¯k+1 = x¯k + σ(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk .
where ∆Blk = Bt¯k+τ −Bt¯k . With the estimate (28) we have for τ small enough for all p ∈ ∆(I)
E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p)
]
= E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p)1|X¯k+1−x¯k|<η
]
+ E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p)1|X¯k+1−x¯k|≥η
]
≥ E
[(
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k) + 〈
∂
∂p
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k), p− p¯k〉+ δ|p− p¯k|
2
)
1|X¯k+1−x¯k|<η
]
+E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p)1|X¯k+1−x¯k|≥η
]
= E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k) + 〈
∂
∂p
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k), p− p¯k〉+ δ1|X¯k+1−x¯k|<η|p− p¯k|
2)
]
+E
[
1|X¯k+1−x¯k|≥η
(
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p)− φ
τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)
−〈
∂
∂p
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k), p− p¯k〉
)]
.
Recalling that φτ is convex with respect to p, we get for all p ∈ ∆(I)
E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p)
]
≥ E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k) + 〈
∂
∂p
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k), p− p¯k〉
+δ1|X¯k+1−x¯k|<η|p− p¯k|
2)
]
.
(33)
Step 2: Next we establish an estimate for pk+1 := p
p¯k,x¯k
lk+1
where pp¯k,x¯klk+1 is defined as one step martingale
as in Definition 4.2. with initial data (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k).
Note that by the one step dynamic programming (21) it holds
V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) = E
[
V τ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1,pk+1) + τH(t¯k, x¯k, z¯k(x¯k,pk+1),pk+1)
]
. (34)
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Together with V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) = φ
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) and the estimate (33) we have for all small enough τ > 0
φτ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) ≥ E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k) + τH(t¯k, x¯k, z¯k(x¯k,pk+1),pk+1)
+〈
∂
∂p
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k),pk+1 − p¯k〉+ δ1|X¯k+1−x¯k|<η|p¯k − pk+1|
2
]
.
Since pk+1 and ∆B
lk are independent, φτ has bounded derivatives and pk+1 is a one step martingale,
it holds
E
[
〈
∂
∂p
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k),pk+1 − p¯k〉
]
= E
[
〈
∂
∂p
φτ (t¯k + τ, x¯k + σ(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk , p¯k),pk+1 − p¯k〉
]
= 0.
Furthermore by the Markovian inequality and assumption (A) we have
E
[
1|X¯k+1−x¯k|<η|pk+1 − p¯k|
2
]
= E
[
1|σ(t¯k,x¯k)∆Blk |<η|pk+1 − p¯k|
2
]
≥ c(1− τ
1
2 )E
[
|pk+1 − p¯k|
2
]
.
with a sufficiently small constant c independent of k. Thus
0 ≥ E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)− φ
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) + τH(t¯k, x¯k, z¯k(x¯k,pk+1),pk+1)
+cδ(1− τ
1
2 )|pk+1 − p¯k|
2
]
.
(35)
Since φτ has bounded derivatives it holds by assumption (A)∣∣E [φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)− φτ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)]∣∣ ≤ cτ (36)
and since E [|z¯k(x¯k,pk+1)|] ≤ c (16) it holds by (A) and Ho¨lder
E [τH(t¯k, x¯k, z¯k(x¯k,pk+1),pk+1)] ≤ cτ. (37)
Combining (35)-(37) we have for small enough τ > 0 and a generic constant c′ > 0
E[|pk+1 − p¯k|
2] ≤
c′
cδ(1− τ
1
2 )
τ,
hence for small enough τ and a constant c′′ > 0
E[|pk+1 − p¯k|
2] ≤ c′′τ. (38)
Step 3:
Furthermore we have with (35) and the monotonicity Lemma 3.3., since V τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) = φ
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k)
0 ≥ E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1,pk+1)− φ
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) + τH(t¯k, x¯k, z˜k(x¯k,pk+1),pk+1)
]
− τO(τ), (39)
where
z˜k(x¯k,pk+1) =
1
τ
E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p)(σ
∗)−1(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk
] ∣∣
p=pk+1
.
From the construction of pk+1 and the fact that φ
τ is convex it holds with (27)
E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1,pk+1)
]
≥ E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k) + 〈
∂
∂p
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k),pk+1 − p¯k〉
]
= E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)
]
.
(40)
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It remains to get a suitable estimate for z˜k(x¯k,pk+1). Since φ
τ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in
x, it holds by Taylor expansion in x
z˜k(x¯k,pk+1) =
1
τ
E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p)(σ
∗)−1(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk
] ∣∣
p=pk+1
=
1
τ
E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, x¯k, p)(σ
∗)−1(t¯k, x¯k)∆B
lk
] ∣∣
p=pk+1
+
1
τ
E
[
Dxφ
τ (t¯k + τ, x¯k, p)|∆B
lk |2
] ∣∣
p=pk+1
+O(τ)
=
1
τ
E
[
Dxφ
τ (t¯k + τ, x¯k, p)|∆B
lk |2
] ∣∣
p=pk+1
+O(τ).
Furthermore since Dxφ
τ is Lipschitz continuous in p it holds with (38)
E
[∣∣Dxφτ (t¯k + τ, x¯k,pk+1)|∆Blk |2 −Dxφτ (t¯k + τ, x¯k, p¯k)|∆Blk |2∣∣]
≤ cE
[
|pk+1 − pk||∆B
lk |2
]
≤ cτ
3
2
So from (40) we have
0 ≥ E
[
φτ (t¯k + τ, X¯k+1, p¯k)− φ
τ (t¯k, x¯k, p¯k) + τH(t¯k, x¯k, Dxφ
τ (t¯k + τ, x¯k, p¯k), p¯k)
]
−c(τ
3
2 + τO(τ))
which implies (25) since φτ is equal to φ up to a linear shift.
5 Concluding Remarks and Outlook
In this paper we gave an approximation scheme for the value function of a stochastic differential game
with incomplete information. It is natural to ask whether this approximation might be used to deter-
mine optimal feedback strategies for the informed player. In the deterministic games with complete
information it is well known that the answer is positive (see the step by step motions associated with
feedbacks in [20]). The case of deterministic games with incomplete information has been treated in
[9].
The approximation of optimal strategies for stochastic differential games is a more delicate topic even
in the case with complete information. [2] - also considering the game under a Girsanov transform
- gives a partwise answer under a weak Lipschitz assumption of the feedback control. The result is
shown by using approximations of BSDEs however not in a completely discrete framework. In the
very recent paper [16] approximately Markov strategies are constructed with an approximation that
in contrast to ours takes into account the actions of the other player during the time intervals. This
however makes the approximation much harder to implement.
In fact, if we use the approximation for the construction of optimal strategies for the informed player
we are in the same situation as [21]. For the approximation of the value function in [21] nearly op-
timal policies are constructed which possess a certain optimality in the approximative discrete time
games instead of the continuous time one. To the authors knowledge the problem of finding an effi-
cient approximation of optimal strategies in stochastic differential games (with or without incomplete
information) is open and poses an interesting problem for further research.
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